

Socialist Racism: Ethnic Cleansing and Racial Exclusion in the USSR and Israel

J. Otto Pohl

During the 1970s, both the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks in Soviet Central Asia compared their plight to that of the Palestinians. The Stalin regime deported both the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks from their homelands to dispersed settlements in Central Asia. The similarities between the Soviet policies of expelling and permanently excluding the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks from their homelands and similar Israeli policies towards the Palestinians are not entirely coincidental. The Zionists based their mass expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 and subsequent prohibition on allowing them to return to their homes in part on the Soviet model. The similarities between the two instances of ethnic cleansing are due in large part to this conscious emulation of Stalin's methods by the Zionists.

Historical comparisons of ethnic cleansing are still quite rare and have only touched on a handful of cases. Presently, scholars define ethnic cleansing as the forced removal of ethnically defined populations from specific territories.¹ More importantly the cases compared have been limited. In the case of Stalin's repressions, the comparison most usually made is to Nazi crimes. These comparisons have taken on a highly ideological color. While a few scholars such as Stephane Courtois have sought to put Stalin's crimes on an equal moral plane with those of Hitler, many have resisted the comparison.² A whole slew of arguments have been crafted by academics as to why the Stalin regime's deliberate killing of between 13 and 15 million people is morally less significant in comparison to Hitler's killing of between five and six million Jews. The details of these arguments—which all boil down to systems of relativistic morality based not upon actions, but motivations and the identity of the victims—are less important than the motives of those making them.

The proponents of this position fall into two broad categories. Some of those espousing these arguments are driven by a desire to rehabilitate the USSR and the failed dream of socialism.³ To this end, they seek to transform the victims of state murder by the Soviet government into something else, such as the unintentional results of policies necessary to consolidate and defend the gains of the Great October Revolution.⁴ The political power of these few remaining supporters of the Soviet system is considerably less than the other group that minimizes Stalin's crimes.

This other group is driven by support of a viewpoint that seeks to make the *Shoah* absolutely unique in order to establish the position of Jews as the ultimate

victims in world history. This position is generally linked to support of the Zionist project in Palestine and the continuing dispossession and repression of its native Arab population. Zionism is defined here to mean an ideology aimed at creating a secure Jewish majority state in the territory of the former British Mandate of Palestine. A number of Western academics seeking to minimize Stalin's crimes fall into this category.⁵ Many of them are not Jewish, but espouse a position of "Holocaust uniqueness" regarding ethnically motivated state killings that depicts Jews as "worthy victims" and Eastern Europeans and Muslims as "unworthy victims."⁶ Negative stereotypes of these two groups are still sometimes promoted in Western academia in ways that are considered completely unacceptable regarding Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews.

This concerted effort to oppose any comparison between the atrocities of the USSR and Nazi Germany is perhaps the single greatest factor in the paucity of any comparative studies of Soviet ethnic cleansing. The similarities between Nazi policies of extermination and Stalin's ethnic cleansing are obvious enough to make comparison of the two a natural starting point in contextualizing the two events. They both occurred during World War II, they both involved the wholesale round-up and forced deportation to deadly conditions of whole populations based upon ancestry, and both deflected large amounts of military material and personnel away from the war effort. Prevented from making this first obvious comparison, however, historians never moved on to make other more interesting comparisons between Stalin's deportations and other cases of ethnic cleansing. The hostile intellectual climate to such comparative work greatly retarded scholarship. As a result, such work is about a decade behind where it should be.

Only within the last couple of years have a few comparative works emerged that address the topic. Two recent works which deal with both Stalin's and Hitler's crimes comparatively, along with other cases, are Norman Naimark's *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*⁷ and Eric D. Weitz's *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*.⁸ Both of these books compare a number of cases not only with regard to their similarities and differences, but also their connections to each other. Naimark examines the *Aghed* (Armenian genocide), the *Shoah*, Stalin's deportations of the Chechens and Crimean Tatars (*Surgun*), expulsion of the Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. Weitz begins with a brief description of the *Aghed* before proceeding to examine the violent racial exclusionary policies of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and Yugoslavia under Milosevic. To be sure, the connection between these cases often seems strained and irrelevant to the author's analyses. The fact that both Pol Pot and Milosevic claimed to be communists is not much of a connection between Cambodia and Yugoslavia. Other more logical connections such as those between European powers and their colonies are missing. The atrocities of the French in Algeria for instance are arguably more closely tied into general European history than the Armenian genocide, yet both books completely ignore them. The historical genealogy linking the Ottoman Empire, Soviet

Union, Nazi Germany, Democratic Kampuchea, and post-Tito Yugoslavia thus appears both incomplete and too overarching.

But, despite these problems, both of these books accomplish something very important. They move beyond the sterile and deadlocked debate over comparing Hitler and Stalin. In addition to this comparison, they also compare the actions of both regimes to the Young Turks, the postwar governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Khmer Rouge, and the Serbian leadership. The similarities and differences between Stalin's national deportations and these other crimes against humanity provide missing insights that had almost become lost as a result of sectarian opposition to comparison between Stalin and Hitler. The similarities between Stalin's deportations and the *Ittihadist* deportation of the Armenians may be greater than those they share with Hitler's extermination of Jews. In both cases, the state undertook the mass deportation of ethnically defined groups to desert areas with little food, housing, and medicine. As a result, in each case hundreds of thousands of people perished from material deprivation. This comparison of Soviet policies with countries other than Nazi Germany shows a way to proceed with the comparative history of ethnic cleansing. The powerful political forces in academia proclaiming that comparative history is illegitimate because the *Shoah* is "unique" can simply be bypassed. The obvious first comparison does not have to be made either first nor ever.

One case of ethnic cleansing that is connected with the Stalinist deportations and the Ottoman and Nazi cases as well, but remains absent from both Naimark and Weitz, is the *Nakbah*. *Al Nakbah*, Arabic for "The Catastrophe," refers to the mass expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs from their homeland in 1948. The connections between this case of ethnic cleansing and the Nazi and Ottoman regimes are obvious. Palestine had been under Ottoman rule for centuries before becoming a British Mandate. The *Shoah* created hundreds of thousands of displaced European Jews who subsequently migrated to Palestine. Early in its existence, a full one-third of Israel's population consisted of Holocaust survivors. The Nazi extermination of Jews also provided Israel and its supporters with its most effective propaganda weapon to justify the expulsion of the Palestinians. Less obvious, but arguably more important, are its connections with Soviet ethnic cleansing. Aside from the previously noted fact that many of the same people attempting to minimize Stalin's crimes also seek to minimize or deny Israeli ethnic cleansing and racism, the two events share a number of historical connections. They also share significant similarities and parallels. These connections and similarities, however, have been almost completely ignored by scholars. This lack of attention is unfortunate since the connections still continue to exist and play a very real part in the continued suffering of the Chechens, Palestinians, and other victims.

Connections

The direct connections between Soviet and Israeli ethnic cleansing have been obscured by the poor relations between the two regimes between 1967 and 1991.

During 1948 and 1949, however, the USSR and Israel enjoyed extremely close relations. The USSR provided Israel with the crucial diplomatic and military support that enabled it to carry out the *Nakbah*. The Soviet Union supported the Zionists as a means of weakening the British Empire's power in the Middle East.⁹ Moscow viewed the Arabs as generally supportive of British imperialism and dominated by elements hostile to the Soviet world-view. Moreover, they perceived the socialist views of Labour Zionism to be similar to Soviet communism. On 18 May 1948, the USSR became the first state to recognize the State of Israel and its provisional government.¹⁰ The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee¹¹ sent a special greeting to the president of Israel, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, on 30 May 1948. This greeting expressed the ideological solidarity of the Soviet and Israeli states.

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR is sending you, and through you to the Jews of the State of Israel, ardent congratulations on the occasion of the Jewish State's establishment. Reactionary forces that serve imperialism continue their dark activities, trying to suppress the people's aspiration for freedom and independence. But we believe in the victory of progress and democracy. We hope that only this way the young Jewish State will succeed to overcome the disturbances and will thus occupy its worthy place among nations who fight for real democracy and peace throughout the world . . . The Jewish people acquired for the first time in its entire history of suffering, a truthful defender for its rights, its interests, the USSR, a friend and defender of all nations.¹²

In the following month, the USSR was crucial in facilitating the supply of large amounts of artillery and aircraft from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to Israel in violation of a Security Council arms embargo.¹³ Prior to these shipments from the Soviet bloc, the Zionists had no artillery, armaments absolutely crucial in the expulsion of the Palestinians. In total, between January 1948 and February 1949 (the communist coup took place in February 1948), Czechoslovakia provided the Zionists with over 24,500 Mauser rifles, 84 fighter planes, and 10,000 bombs, as well as other armaments.¹⁴ Communist Czech forces also trained 120 *Haganah* fighter pilots and paratroopers. Finally, the communist Czech government sent 1,000 Jewish soldiers to fight for the Zionists against the Arabs in Palestine in December 1948. The newly Communist government of Poland also provided the Zionists with substantial assistance.¹⁵ The Polish military ran a training base for *Haganah* soldiers at Bolkowo. More significantly, the Polish regime facilitated the emigration of over 100,000 Polish Jews to Palestine from May 1946 to March 1947. All of these actions had the authorization of the Soviet government on the highest level that is the personal support of Joseph Stalin.

Perhaps more importantly, the USSR and its satellites consistently supported the Israeli position against the Arabs, British, and even United States in the United Nations.¹⁶ Following the admission of Israel to the UN on 11 May 1949, at the insistence of the Soviet bloc, the Polish representative made the following comments.

The Jewish people advancing along peaceful and progressive lines can rely on the assistance of Poland, the Soviet Republics and the People's Democracies of Europe. Israel

will doubtless remember that these countries have been its true friends at the troubled time of its emergence¹⁷

During 1948 and 1949, the Soviet bloc treated Israel almost as if it was one of its members. Soviet bloc arms and support secured Israel's founding and the dispossession of the Palestinians.

Israel initially expressed thanks for this support in the most glowingly obsequious Stalinist language. The fulsome praise of Stalin from the Israeli leadership rivaled that of the most supplicant communist parties. On 4 November 1948, David Ben-Gurion sent the following telegram to Joseph Stalin.

In the name of the State of Israel and in my own name I am pleased to offer best wishes on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution which guaranteed national equality to the peoples of the USSR, secured employment and a means of existence for all its workers, opened the path to social and spiritual progress for the urban and rural masses and gave birth to the powerful Red Army which achieved an immense feat in the war against the fascist Nazi threat. Our people will never forget the assistance rendered by struggle for liberty and independence in its historic homeland. I wish the people of your country fulfillment, reconstruction in the wake of the war, economic progress, peace and international understanding.¹⁸

Ben-Gurion greatly admired the Soviet Union under Stalin as a model for building a strong state and sought to emulate this success in Israel. Most Labor Zionists shared his enthusiasm for the Soviet experiment. Both the Soviet and Israeli states also espoused a socialist rhetoric dedicated to equality while practicing forms of racial discrimination similar to apartheid in South Africa. After 1949, Soviet-Israeli relations deteriorated steadily, particularly over the issue of the Israeli government encouraging the emigration of educated and skilled Jews from the USSR.¹⁹ Moscow found this policy unacceptable on practical and ideological grounds. First, they desperately needed these workers to rebuild the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II. Second, it implied that the USSR was not a fully socialist state that had solved all nationality problems within its borders, including the existence of anti-Semitism. Such an insult could be tolerated only so long.

This deterioration of relations continued throughout the next several decades. In 1955, Czechoslovakia signed an arms deal with Israel's chief enemy, Nasser's Egypt. In 1956, the USSR along with the United States opposed the joint British, French, and Israeli assault on Egypt to seize the Suez Canal. During the 1967 and 1973 wars, the USSR supported the Arab states against Israel diplomatically and militarily. Finally after 1974, the USSR began to provide official support to the PLO. Despite these events, the Soviet government continued to support the existence of Israel as a Jewish state within its 1949–1967 borders.²⁰ These later events have, however, prevented historians from realizing the full ramifications of the close Soviet-Israeli relations on Israeli policies during the creation of the state.

A more direct connection between Soviet and Israeli ethnic cleansing is the fact that the Soviet Union provided the Israelis with a successful model of ethnic cleansing. The Soviet deportations were not their only model. During the 1930s, the Zion-

ists most frequently pointed to the Greek and Turkish population exchange ratified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne as a model for expelling the Palestinians.²¹ This treaty between the Greek and Turkish governments ratified the forced expulsion of over 1,200,000 Greeks from Turkey and 350,000 Turks from Greece.²² Neither government consulted the people actually evicted from their homes. The poor material conditions for these resettled refugees resulted in massive mortality from malnutrition and disease. Some 300,000 Greek expellees perished either during resettlement to Greece or shortly afterwards from such causes.²³ Despite being touted as a model for dealing humanely with the problem of ethnic conflicts arising from the presence of irredentist minorities, the Greek-Turkish population exchange resulted in massive human suffering and death.

The Zionists also later mentioned the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia sanctioned by the Allies at Potsdam as a precedent for removing the Arabs from Palestine.²⁴ The governments of Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania followed suit in forcibly evicting many of their German minorities. The Allies sanctioned the Hungarian expulsions after they began. The Romanian and Yugoslav expulsions in contrast clearly constituted illegal acts under international law. In total, the new governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia expelled over 11.5 million ethnic Germans into the current borders of Germany.²⁵ Recent research puts the number of ethnic Germans to perish during this forced exodus at 1.4 million (11.6%).²⁶ One Zionist scholar, Joseph Schectman, researched and wrote an entire book on the subject with an aim to providing a model and justification of later Israeli actions.²⁷ The expulsion of ethnic Germans from Central Europe and the Balkans in the years immediately after World War II remains the largest single case of ethnic cleansing in world history.

Already by the 1940s, however, the Soviet Union had become the favored model of the dominant Labour Zionists. The Zionists explicitly modeled the expulsion of the Palestinians in part on the earlier Soviet deportations of the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars.²⁸ Discussions of the issue of "transfer" directly referred to the Stalinist dispersal of these two peoples across Soviet Asia as a positive model to follow regarding the Palestinian Arabs.²⁹ As early as 1943, Labour Zionist founder of the newspaper *Davar*, Berl Katznelson, praised Stalin's forced expulsion of the Russian-Germans to desolate wastelands where a quarter of the population died in five years³⁰ as a model for how to deal with the natives of Palestine. He named a number of Jewish settlements in Palestine that had been created by displacing the previous Arab residents and advocated that the policy of transfer be extended based on the Soviet model.

Our contemporary history has known a number of transfers . . . [for instance] the U.S.S.R. arranged the transfer of one million Germans living in the Volga region and transferred them to very distant places . . . one could assume that this transfer was done against the will of the transferees . . . there could be possible situations that would make [Arab] population transfer desirable for both sides . . . who is the socialist who is interested in rejecting the very idea beforehand and stigmatizing it as something unfair? Has Merhavyah

not been built on transfer? Were it not for many of these transfers Hashomer Hatza'ir [which later in 1948 founded the Madam Party] would not be resisting today in Merhavyah or Mihmar Ha'emek or other places . . . and if what has been done for a settlement of Hashomer Hatza'ir is a fair deed, why would it not be fair when it would be done on a much larger and greater scale, not just of Hashomer Hatza'ir but for the whole of Israel.³¹

The Zionists certainly knew of the humanitarian costs involved in the Soviet deportations if only because a number of Polish and Lithuanian Jews living in Palestine, including later Israeli prime minister Menachim Begin, had themselves been exiled to Siberia.³² Despite this knowledge, they proceeded with forcibly expelling most of the native Arab population from Palestine based in part upon the Soviet model.

Indeed, the Zionists leadership continued to hold up the Stalinist deportations as justified, positive, and a model for Israel to deal with the Palestinian Arab population remaining under its control after *Al Nakbah*. On 8 January 1949, Ya'acov Meridor of the *Herut* Party (forerunner of the *Likud*) and veteran of the *Irgun* stood up in the Knesset and praised Stalin's deportation of the Russian-Germans as a model for Israel to emulate regarding the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel.

Soviet Russia knew how to solve the problem of the Volga Germans during the war. There were 800,000 Germans in that region. They transferred them to the east, beyond the Urals. If there should be a second round of fighting, where shall we transfer this fifth column? With the coastal region being only 10 miles wide, how shall we do it?³³

The terrible suffering of the Russian-Germans in Kazakhstan and Siberia where the Soviet regime exiled them did not concern Meridor. The endorsement of Stalin's brutal annihilation of the Russian-German communities of the USSR by both of Israel's main political parties seems all but forgotten today.

The Israeli legation to Moscow also supported the Stalinist position that the deported peoples were all actually guilty of treason and collaboration with the Nazis as the Soviet government charged. On 20 March 1949, an internal Israeli Foreign Ministry report from Counselor of the Israeli legation to Moscow, Namir to Friedman in Tel Aviv repeated the Soviet libel of mass treason against the whole of the Crimean Tatar people: "The treachery of the Tatars in the Crimea has been punished but not forgotten."³⁴ The Soviet Union and Israel were two of several regimes to practice mass punishment based upon race during the 1940s. It is thus hardly surprising that their officials would endorse such racially based collective punishment for non-existent crimes.

Similarities

Since the Stalinist deportations of the Russian-Germans and Crimean Tatars served as models for the Israeli expulsion of the Palestinians, it is not surprising that the two policies contain significant similarities. Organized Soviet style expulsions accounted for around 250,000 of the 750,000 Palestinians driven out of what became

the State of Israel in 1948–1949.³⁵ In particular, the fate of the 60,000 Palestinian expellees from Lydda and Ramle resembled the Soviet deportations.³⁶ The remaining 500,000 displaced Palestinians fled the widespread massacre, rape, and looting of Arab civilians by Zionist military forces. These refugees more closely resemble the ethnic German who fled similar atrocities by Soviet and Polish forces committed east of the Oder-Neisse River.³⁷ Both the Soviet and Israeli cases involved militarized units that rounded up the targeted population and forcibly removed them from their ancestral villages and transported them to lands totally unprepared for their accommodation.³⁸ The deportees had little time to prepare for their forced eviction from their homes and could only bring a few possessions with them. They permanently lost most of their property and never received compensation for these losses. The regimes responsible for their expulsion engaged in large-scale pillaging and destruction of vineyards, orchards, mosques, churches, and cemeteries. They forced the deportees into poorly built camps in desolate areas without providing for their care. Lack of proper housing, nutrition, and medical care in the new areas of settlement led to outbreaks of contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, deaths from exposure, and high rates of infant mortality. The small State of Israel did an amazingly good job of emulating the accomplishments of the much larger, experienced, and better endowed Soviet state in the field of ethnic cleansing.

The Soviet and Israeli regimes also intended their expulsions to be permanent. On 26 November 1948, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed that national deportees had been exiled “forever.”³⁹ This decree and subsequent legislation on this matter decreed a permanent ban on all people biologically descended of certain cultural groups from living in their ancestral lands or receiving compensation for lost family property. It represented a codification of racial exclusion every bit as discriminatory as anything ever enacted by the Nazis, the South Africans, or the Jim Crow South. The decrees releasing the exiles from the restrictions of the special settlements in 1955 and 1956 also prohibited them from returning to their former places of residence or receiving any compensation for property seized during the deportations.⁴⁰ On 11 February 1957, the Soviet government restored territorial autonomy to the Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, and Kalmyks in their traditional homelands.⁴¹ Over the next few years the vast majority of these exiled nationalities returned to their native territories. The categorical legal prohibition on Crimean Tatars living in their historical homeland remained until 1967.⁴² In practice, this ban remained for over 95% of the population until 1988.⁴³ A total legal ban on the Meskhetian Turks returning to their ancestral homeland existed until 1968.⁴⁴ In practice, such a ban still exists. The Georgian government has allowed only a few hundred of the more than 300,000 Meskhetian Turks to live in Georgia.⁴⁵ The Russian-Germans legally received the equal right with other Soviet citizens to choose their place of residence only in 1972.⁴⁶ Numerous restrictions, however, effectively still prohibit a large-scale return to the Volga. Among these restrictions is the presence of a Russian population settled in the region after the deportations that is

extremely hostile to the notion of a German return to the Volga. No compensation has ever been seriously offered by either the Soviet government or the Russian Federation to the deported peoples.

The Israeli regime also adopted similar legislation to permanently ban the displaced Palestinians from ever returning to their lands or receiving compensation for their stolen property. The 1950 Absentee Property Law, like its Soviet counterparts, banned all Palestinians expelled in 1947 and 1948 and their descendents from ever returning to their ancestral homeland, becoming Israeli citizens, or receiving compensation for confiscated property.⁴⁷ This law is racially based since it applies only to Arabs and automatically transmits these legal disabilities from generation to generation on the basis of descent. The founding of the State of Israel upon this and other laws distinguishing rights on the basis of immutable biological descent from cultural groups is the basis for the charge that Zionism equals racism.

Both the Soviet and Israeli governments used violent force to prevent the permanent return of members of the exiled nationalities and their descendents. The Soviet regime forcibly returned to areas of exiled deportees that returned to their former homes. They arrested and tried as criminals a significant portion of these fugitives. Up until the end of 1948, leaving the special settlements without permission constituted a violation of article 82 of the RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) criminal code and carried up to eight years in labor camp.⁴⁸ Between 1942 and 1948, the NKVD and MVD detained and forcibly returned to special settlements 1,539 exiles that had managed to return to their former homelands.⁴⁹ They formally arrested 1,115 of these people. The other 424 they returned to exile without the formality of arrest. In Crimea, the Soviet security organs detained 700 such fugitives. They tried and sentenced 111 to terms in labor camps, arrested and returned 409 to special settlements under armed convey, and returned 180 without arrest. In the former territory of the Volga German Republic, the Soviet security police arrested and tried 23 returnees, arrested and returned under convey 52 people, and returned without arrest 54 people. The Georgian authorities detained 608 exiles that returned on their own volition. Special MVD boards tried and convicted 106 of them and normal courts convicted another 152. The security organs forcibly transferred the majority of the remaining fugitives back to their special settlements. The Soviet security forces also detained 47 returning Chechen exiles, 37 Balkars, and seven Kalmyks from 1945 to 1948. The Stalin regime vigilantly prevented the deported nationalities from permanently returning to their homelands through arrests and renewed deportations.

In the case of the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks, such policies continued up until the collapse of the USSR. Between September 1967 and 15 July 1968, over 12,000 Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea. The Soviet government granted only 18 families and 13 individual residency permits and sentenced 17 to terms of imprisonment for passport violations. Soviet authorities forcibly expelled most of the remainder back to Uzbekistan.⁵⁰ Crimean Tatars denied registration permits could not legally work, notarize home purchases, or enroll their children in school. They

also remained subject to expulsion from Crimea. Robbery, beatings, and destruction of houses frequently accompanied these evictions.⁵¹ Between 1978 and 1980, the Soviet authorities expelled 640 out of 700 unregistered Crimean Tatar families from Crimea.⁵² Only in 1988 did the Soviet regime cease the policy of forcibly deporting returning Crimean Tatars from Crimea to Uzbekistan.

The Soviet government also used similar methods to prevent the return of Meskhetian Turks to Georgia. Throughout the 1960s, Georgian authorities instigated mass round-ups and expulsions of returning Meskhetian Turk families. In total, from 1960 to 1969, the Soviet government expelled 705 Meskhetian Turk families who managed to return to Georgia.⁵³ The largest of these expulsions took place on 10 June 1969 and involved 500 families. The present Georgian government has maintained the old Soviet policy of preventing any substantial return by the Meskhetian Turks.

Israel maintained a policy of shooting returning Palestinian refugees from 1948 until 1956. During this time period, Israeli Frontier Guards shot and killed over 2,700 Palestinian Arab refugees attempting to return to their homes.⁵⁴ The vast majority of those shot were unarmed. This policy served to deter the mass return of Palestinians on their own volition.

The Israeli military government imposed upon those Palestinian Arabs remaining under its control after 1949 shared a great deal of similarities with the Soviet special settlement regime. In both cases the regime confined ethnically defined classes of people to restricted areas of settlement and movement. Special settlers in the USSR and Arabs in Israel came under the administration and surveillance of a legal framework separate from other citizens. They could live only in certain designated zones, they had to register with special police representatives on a regular basis, they had to obtain special permits to travel beyond tightly circumscribed areas, and they were subject to administrative fines and incarceration.⁵⁵ The Israeli military government and Soviet NKVD wielded incredible power over the every day lives of their wards.

Often the Soviet and Israeli commandants abused this power over their charges. In addition to routine humiliations and repressions, this abuse sometimes involved lethal force. A collective farm guard shot and killed a four-year-old Karachai girl taking an apple from an orchard in the summer of 1944. The guard also shot her father as he ran to her. The local NKVD commandant refused to allow the wounded father to be transported to a hospital and he died 16 days later.⁵⁶ Two years later, a collective farm chairman in Akmola, Kazakhstan ordered the arson of a Chechen house with the residents still inside, resulting in two deaths.⁵⁷ The special settlers lacked most rights enjoyed by other Soviet citizens including on occasion even the right to life.

Documented Israeli killings of its Palestinian citizens under the military government were even greater than in the Soviet case. The most famous Israeli massacre of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship is Kafr Qasim.⁵⁸ At 4:30 p.m. on 29 October 1956, the Israeli Frontier Guard placed a 5 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew upon the village of

Kafr Qasim. The Frontier Guard set itself up at the western entrance of the village and enforced the curfew by stopping those returning from work and shooting them execution style. In the first hour of the curfew, the Frontier Guard shot and killed 47 Palestinians with Israeli citizenship living in Kafr Qasim. This atrocity against unarmed citizens of its own country stemmed directly from Israel's discriminatory system of rule regarding its Arab citizens.

The effects of long-term exile from their historic homelands also had some similar effects on the national development of the Palestinians and certain deported nationalities in the USSR. In particular, the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks share a number of similarities with the Palestinians in regards to their collective reactions to the experiences of dispossession. Like the Palestinians, both the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks maintained strong emotional attachments to their ancestral homelands and developed strong national movements dedicated to repatriation. In the 1970s, both the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks compared their plight to that of the Palestinians.⁵⁹ They had all been forcibly expelled from their homelands and denied the right to return. The Soviet and Israeli states both used a great deal of violence to accomplish and maintain this ethnic cleansing.

In all three cases, the groups cultivated an idyllic memory of their national homeland before their traumatic mass uprooting and passed it down from generation to generation. Grandparents, parents, aunts, and uncles told each new generation stories about the lost homeland and the horrors of expulsion from it.⁶⁰ The very real misery of exile contrasted sharply with this romanticized view of life prior to banishment. Children from all three groups identify the villages and towns of their ancestors as their places of origin, rather than the lands in which they were born and live. This identification has persisted for over half a century, three generations, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of these people have never been allowed even to visit their ancestral homelands. The experiences of exile have created a strong sense of national consciousness based upon an emotional connection to their lost homelands among the Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and Palestinians.

The collective and trans-generational memory of homeland and their brutal expulsion from it spurred political movements aimed at reversing the exile among all three groups. Although the tactics of the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks differed considerably from those of the Palestinians, they shared similar goals. All three groups sought collectively to return to their traditional homelands and restore or create their own national state structure. The deported nationalities in Kazakhstan and Central Asia sought autonomy within the USSR. The Crimean Tatars sought the restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Meskhetian Turks desired the creation of an autonomous territory in Meskheta with its capitol at Akhaltsikhe.⁶¹ The Palestinians, in contrast, desired an independent state. All three groups shared a strong desire to return to their national homelands that formed the basis of popular political movements.

Differences

There are of course significant differences in the two cases as well. First, the USSR had far more resources at its disposal and could thus carry out its ethnic cleansing far more efficiently. The nationalities forcibly deported by the Stalin regime collectively made up a small percentage of the Soviet population. In total, the Soviet government deported around six million people of which 2.33 million took place during 1941–1945.⁶² Nationalities exiled in their entirety numbered almost 2 million people.⁶³ This figure, however, as large as it is, represented less than 1.5% of the total Soviet population. The Stalin regime could thus rather easily round up and deport these small nationalities in a matter of days. The deportation of the Karachais (69,267 people) took only a single day, the Kalmyks (93,139 people) two days, the Crimean Tatars (183,155 people) three days and the Chechens and Ingush (478,479 people) seven days.⁶⁴ The small population of these nationalities points to the paranoid nature of the Stalin regime in considering them a threat of any kind.

The limited size of these nationalities in comparison to the vast resources of the Soviet state meant that the Stalin regime could completely ethnically cleanse them from their native territories. The Stalin regime aimed at confining every single member of the nationalities targeted for deportation in special settlements located in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and Siberia. To this end, the NKVD conducted dragnets and mop up operations throughout the USSR and even beyond its borders as far west as the United States and British occupation zones of Germany to make sure no one escaped.⁶⁵ To their shame, the United States and British forces collaborated actively with the Stalin regime in this effort.⁶⁶ The Soviet ethnic cleansing operations remain a model of totality.

In contrast, despite the wishes of the Zionists, the ethnic cleansing of Palestine remained incomplete. About 150,000 Palestinian Arabs out of a population of 900,000 remained in the territory that became Israel.⁶⁷ Unlike the Soviets, the Zionists operated under a number of constraints that made their job more difficult. First, the Arabs were not an insignificant minority of Palestine's population. Rather they formed a two-thirds majority of Palestine's population in 1947. They were 42% even in the territory apportioned to be a Jewish state.⁶⁸ Second, although hopelessly outgunned, they did have some military organization and some support in this matter from other Arab states. They could thus put up some resistance to the expulsions. Finally, like in the case of the Ottoman deportation of the Armenians, the high international profile of certain cities protected the Palestinian residents from expulsion. This is most evident regarding the Christians of Nazareth and can be compared to the protection by international attention afforded to Armenians in Istanbul, Izmir, and Jerusalem during World War One.⁶⁹ After the fighting ceased, international scrutiny served to protect most of the Palestinian population remaining under Israeli rule from further expulsions. The Zionists thus had to be content

with an 80% success rate in their ethnic cleansing versus the near 100% success of their Soviet models.

Both the Soviets and Israelis engaged in a number of massacres in the course of ethnic cleansing during the 1940s. The purpose of these massacres, however, differed. In the Soviet case, the NKVD physically liquidated communities that proved too burdensome to deport. That is, the massacres served to remove the last remaining targeted communities that had not been loaded onto trains and deported from their homelands. The most famous case was the village of Khaibakh in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Poor weather conditions prevented the NKVD from being able to deport the Chechens from the village of Khaibakh. Instead of loading these villagers onto trains, the NKVD herded over 700 Chechen men, women, and children into barns and sheds and set the structures on fire.⁷⁰ The vast majority of these unfortunates perished in the flames. Khaibakh remains a rallying cry of Chechen nationalists to this day.

In contrast, the Zionists massacred Palestinians in 1948 to cause their flight in fear from areas that became Israel in 1949. Rather than serve to complete the process of ethnic cleansing, these atrocities served to start it from certain areas. The most famous of such massacres occurred at Deir Yasin on 9 April 1948.⁷¹ Irgun and LEHI forces rounded up over 200 Arab men, women, and children from this village and killed them in order to terrorize other Palestinians into leaving land coveted by the Zionists. This policy had great success. Many of the Palestinians that fled their homes in 1948 did so specifically because they feared Zionist forces would repeat the events of Deir Yasin in their villages. Like Khaibakh for the Chechens, Deir Yasin is a symbol of national tragedy for the Palestinians. They commemorate the massacre every April 9.

The internal nature of the Soviet deportations versus the external nature of the Israeli expulsions is another key difference between the two cases. The Stalin regime exiled the deported peoples to confined settlements under NKVD control and surveillance within the borders of the USSR. It thus retained ultimate power over the material and legal conditions of the exiles. Foreign governments and organizations could not provide any assistance to the special settlers. Instead, the special settlers remained dependent upon the inadequate provisions given by the Soviet government until they could physically adapt to the harsh conditions of their new surroundings and provide for all their own food, housing, clothing, and other necessities. Not until 1948–1949 did live births outnumber deaths among the exiled nationalities.⁷² In the meantime, hundreds of thousands perished from malnutrition, disease, and exposure as a result of this material deprivation. Between 1941 and 1948, the NKVD and MVD recorded 309,100 deaths among the exiles confined to special settlements versus only 82,391 births.⁷³ These fatalities included 23.7% of the deported Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, and Balkars; 19.6% of the Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians; 17.4% of the Kalmyks; and 14.6% of the Turks, Kurds, and Hemshins. Not included in these figures are deaths during the initial round-ups and transportation, deaths among deportees mobilized into labor army

work sites, deaths among those later incarcerated and deaths in special settlements not recorded by the special commandants. In total, the number of excess deaths among the deported nationalities during the 1940s probably exceeded half a million people.⁷⁴

The large size of the USSR gave it the ability to exile internally the victims of its ethnic cleansing. This option had several advantages over expulsion across international boundaries. First, it kept the suspect population under Soviet control. They could not organize and agitate against the USSR from beyond its frontiers. It thus eliminated the problem of troublesome émigré groups. Second, it allowed the Soviet government actually to inflict physical punishment upon the deported peoples in addition to the initial expulsions. In Soviet eyes, the alleged crimes of treason committed by these nationalities required a great deal of punishment. Finally, it provided the regime with a source of cheap labor to develop sparsely inhabited regions of the USSR. It thus combined ethnic cleansing and forced labor in a peculiarly Soviet manner.

In contrast, Palestine had only a small fraction of the vast land area of the former Soviet Union. Whereas Stalin deported the special settlers thousands of kilometers across the Eurasian continent in train journeys that took weeks, the Israeli expulsions at most covered hundreds of kilometers and involved journeys of up to a day. That was all it took to push the Palestinian Arabs beyond the borders of Israeli controlled land into territory under Jordanian, Lebanese, Egyptian, or Syrian control. Once expelled to areas under Arab control, the welfare of the Palestinians ceased to be a concern for the Israelis. Instead it became a humanitarian problem for the receiving states. These states had not agreed to accept and accommodate the mass of impoverished humanity sent across their borders. Yet, because they no longer remained under Israeli control, the Palestinian refugees benefited from the fact that outside forces could assist them materially. In particular, the UNRWA (United Nations Relief Works Agency) played a vital role in providing basic necessities for the refugees.⁷⁵ This resulted in the Palestinian refugees reaching a subsistence level much quicker than the deported nationalities of the Soviet Union. Hence overall mortality among the expelled Palestinians was much lower than among the victims of Stalin's ethnic cleansing. They also remained free from the harsh Israeli restrictions imposed upon those Palestinian not expelled. Israeli ethnic cleansing thus sought to excise the Palestinian Arab population from their land, but could not further punish them.

The final notable difference between the deported Soviet nationalities and the Palestinians is the means by which they have promoted their respective struggles to return to their homelands. The Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks never resorted to violence in their decades-long struggle for rehabilitation and repatriation. They instead relied upon letters, appeals, petitions, peaceful demonstrations and other forms of moral pressure to persuade the Soviet government to restore their previous rights.⁷⁶ Many of these actions were quite spectacular in their ability to mobilize grassroots participation. The Crimean Tatar petition to the Twenty-Third

Congress of the CPSU in March 1966 had over 130,000 signatures, almost the entire adult population of the nationality.⁷⁷ In 1969, over 7,000 Meskhetian Turks demonstrated in Tbilisi out of a total population of only 200,000 people.⁷⁸ The Soviet government responded to these petitions and demonstrations with violence and a complete refusal to consider the issue of repatriation. Only when the Soviet Union began to collapse did the Crimean Tatars make any substantial progress on returning to their ancestral homeland. The Meskhetian Turks still remained dispersed across Eurasia unable to return to Georgia.

The Palestinians in contrast made irregular military activity the focal point of their struggle against the Israelis. Guerrilla raids against Israel by Palestinians continued after the 1948 War all the way until the 1956 War and beyond.⁷⁹ These early raids were connected to the military forces of various Arab states and represented a low level continuation of the 1948 War. The establishment of the PLO in 1964 represented the creation of a Palestinian entity committed to obtaining its goals by armed struggle independent of the existing Arab armies and governments.⁸⁰ The success of the Algerian revolution against France in 1962 inspired the PLO to adopt this position.⁸¹ The credibility of the PLO as an independent military force received a great boost on 21 March 1968 when they held off the Israelis at Karameh.⁸² This led to a mass increase of cross border raids against the Israelis from 1968 to 1970. The Israelis in turn responded with devastating raids against civilian targets in neighboring Arab states. Attempts to create guerilla movements inside Palestine were largely unsuccessful. Only in the Gaza Strip did Palestinian militants manage to establish a foothold.⁸³ By the early 1970s, realistic hopes of emulating the Algerian model inside Palestine had almost entirely evaporated.

Frustrated by a lack of progress against the Israelis, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) began targeting Israeli targets outside the Middle East. On 23 July 1968 they hijacked an El Al flight on its way from Rome to Tel Aviv.⁸⁴ Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the PFLP and other Palestinian organizations engaged in hijackings and other attacks on Israeli and related targets in Europe. These actions generated international attention for the Palestinian cause and were loudly condemned by the United States and other powers. This attention ultimately benefited the Palestinians and harmed the Israelis in the international arena. Since 1987, Palestinian tactics have gone through a number of changes. The Palestinians expelled in 1948 and their descendents, however, still cannot return to their lost homes.

The pacifistic nature of the movements for rehabilitation by the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks and the militant nature of the modern Palestinian national movement are the result of their early development. In the USSR, the leaders of the movements in the 1950s and early 1960s had all been involved with the Soviet state to some extent and considered themselves loyal citizens wrongfully deprived of their national rights. This is especially true for the very well organized and mobilized Crimean Tatars. Almost all the leaders of the Crimean Tatar national movement in the 1950s were members of the Communist Party and had been active in

the administration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.⁸⁵ Many of them had also fought with the Soviet Red Army or Soviet partisan movement against Nazi Germany.⁸⁶ They did not oppose the existence of the USSR. Indeed, they had helped construct it in the 1920s and 1930s in Crimea. The Crimean Tatar activists merely sought to restore the legal status their nationality enjoyed in the USSR prior to the deportations in 1944. They thus sought to work within the legal framework of the Soviet system to achieve this goal: a strategy that entailed eschewing all violence. The Crimean Tatars have maintained this commitment to legality and peaceful means throughout the Soviet era and up until the present day.

The founders of the Palestinian resistance in the wake of the *Nakbah* in contrast never considered themselves citizens of Israel, nor did they consider Israel as constituted to be a legitimate state. For the Palestinians it was not a matter of convincing Israel to obey its own laws as was the Soviet case regarding the deported peoples. Rather, the founding laws of Israel themselves excluded the Palestinians from their homeland and national rights. Repeal of these laws would not only result in the restoration of Palestinian rights, but also the dissolution of Israel as a Jewish State and the end of the Zionist enterprise. There was thus no hope of the Palestinians persuading the Israelis to grant them their rights by writing legalistic petitions and letters. Armed struggle had, however, convinced the French to relinquish Algeria despite the *colons*. From 1948 until the late 1980s, peaceful resistance looked to have no chance of success to the Palestinians. In contrast, during the 1960s, armed struggle did appear to have a possibility of advancing their goals.

Conclusion

The strong resistance by many scholars to comparing Stalinist and National Socialist crimes has greatly retarded scholarship. It has had the effect of stifling all comparative historical research regarding state terror. Those opposed to the comparison have generally been driven by an ideological preoccupation with making Nazi crimes uniquely evil and have thus sought to minimize the crimes of Stalin and other communists. The primary political goal served by portraying the Holocaust as uniquely evil has been in support of the State of Israel and its crimes against the Palestinian people. Not coincidentally, the Zionists in 1948 modeled their expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine in part upon Stalin's national deportations. In particular, they evoked the exile of the Volga Germans to Kazakhstan and Siberia as a model. The Zionists also depended upon Soviet military and diplomatic assistance to achieve their goal of ethnically cleansing the Palestinians. The minimization of Stalinist crimes by academic supporters of Israel, particularly in the United States, must be seen in this light. The USSR was both the model and the first benefactor of the Zionist state. Hence there remains a strong reluctance by Zionists like Deborah Lipstadt, Charles Maier, and Stephen Wheatcroft to fully acknowledge the racially motivated crimes of the Stalin regime.

Notes

1. Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, *Ethnic Cleansing* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1996), p. 3 and also Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 3.
2. Stephane Courtois, trans. Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer, *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 1–31 for the mainstream academic opinion he was refuting see Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 76 and most popularly Deborah Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory* (NY: Free Press, 1993), p. 212.
3. The most extended recent apologia for Stalinism is a joint effort by German, American, and French Leftists published in Germany, Jens Mecklenburg and Wolfgang Wipperman, “*Roter Holocaust?*” *Kritik des Schwarzbuchs des Kommunismus* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1998).
4. It is of course possible to take a favorable position towards Marxist socialism and even the Bolshevik Revolution and early regime and not seek to minimize Stalin’s crimes. Many Trotskyite and independent Marxists including some in the CPSU such as Alexei Kosterin, Pitor Grigorenko and Dominick Hollmann were among the strongest critics of the Soviet regime.
5. In addition to Maier and Lipstadt, both of whom are Jewish, Stephen Wheatcroft, a British Gentile also takes this position. See S.G. Wheatcroft, “The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930–45,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 8 (Dec. 1996), pp. 1319–1353.
6. For an explanation of this concept see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 37.
7. Naimark, Norman, *Fired of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
8. Weitz, Eric D., *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
9. Arnold Kramer, *The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1953* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1974), p. 40–41.
10. Eytan Bentsur, *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941–1953* (London: Frank and Cass, 2000), vol. I, doc. 122, p. 283.
11. A Soviet organization established during World War II to appeal to American Jews to support the Soviet war effort as an act of solidarity with its Jewish population.
12. Cited in Yosef Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953–1967: From Confrontation to Disruption* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. xxiii.
13. Bentsur, vol. I, doc. 127, p. 291 and doc. 150, pp. 325–326.
14. Peter Brod, “Soviet-Israeli Relations 1948–1956: from Courtship to Crisis,” in Roberts S. Wistrich ed. *The Left against Zion: Communism, Israel, and the Middle East* (London: Valentine, Mitchell & Co. Ltd., 1979), p. 57.
15. Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, *After the Holocaust: Polish-Jewish Conflict in the Wake of World War II* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2003), pp. 35–36.
16. Govrin, pp. xxiv–xxx.
17. Cited in Govrin, p. xxix.
18. Bentsur, vol. I, doc. 192, p. 395.
19. Kramer, pp. 123–126.
20. David Gilmour, *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians* (London: Sphere Books, 1982), pp. 212–214.
21. Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 53.
22. Naimark, p. 54.
23. Naimark, p. 186.
24. Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians*, p. 128.
25. Ther, p. xii.

26. Ther, endnote 6, p. 27.
27. Norman Finkelstein e-mail to author 2 August 2003.
28. Anita Shapira, *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 285.
29. Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians*, p. 162.
30. Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Lost Empire* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), table 8, p. 67.
31. Cited in Nur Masalha, *A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians 1949–1996* (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), p. 67.
32. Nora Levin, *The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917: Paradox of Survival* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), vol. I, p. 371.
33. Cited in Masalha, pp. 1–2.
34. Bentsur, doc. 234, pp. 455–456.
35. Michael Palumbo, *The Palestinian Catastrophe*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), p. 204.
36. Nur Masalha, *The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003), pp. 29–32.
37. Naimark, pp. 124–136.
38. For the Soviet deportations see Nikolai Bugai, ed., *Iosif Stalin – Lavrentiiu Berii: “Ikh nado deportivorat’: Dokumenty, fakty, Kommentarii* (Moscow: Druzhba narodov, 1992) and Svetlana Alieva ed., *Tak eto bylo: Natsional’nye repressi v SSSR, 1919–1952 gody* (Moscow: Insan, 1993).
39. Document reproduced in Alieva, vol. I, pp. 294–295.
40. Documents reproduced in Vladimir Auman and Valentina Chebatoreva, *Istoriia rossiiskikh nemtsev v dokumentakh, 1763–1992 gg* (Moscow: MIGUP, 1993), p. 177 and Nikolai Bugai, *Ikh*, doc. 55, pp. 270–271, doc. 57, p. 273 and doc. 59, pp. 274–275.
41. Document reproduced in Aliev, p. 49.
42. Mikhail Guboglo and Svetlana Chervonnaia, *Krymsko-Tatarskoe natsional’noe dvizhenie, istoriia, problemy, perspektivy* (Moscow: RAN, 1992), vol. II, doc. 21, pp. 51–52.
43. Andrew Wilson, “Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming,” in Edward Allworth, ed. *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 282–283.
44. Document reproduced in English translation in Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* (NY: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 196–197.
45. Dan Brennan, “The Long Way Home,” *Scotland on Sunday*, 29 February 2004, found at <http://news.scotsman.com/archive.cfm?id+231942004> downloaded on 18 May 2004.
46. Document reproduced in Auman and Chebatoreva, p. 180.
47. An English translation of the relevant portion of the Israeli law is reproduced in Uri Davis, *Israel: An Apartheid State* (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 1987), p. 35.
48. Bugai and Gonov, p. 234.
49. Bugai, *Ikh*, doc. 20, pp. 165–169.
50. *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii (KTS)* (Amsterdam: Fond Gerstena for issues 1–27 published 1968–1972 and New York: Khronika for issues 28–61 published 1972–1981), no. 5, pp. 98–101.
51. *KTS*, no. 18, pp. 131–132, no. 31, docs. 4–6, pp. 121–123, no. 41, pp. 55–59 and no. 42, pp. 71–75.
52. *KTS*, no. 57, p. 54.
53. *KTS*, no. 19, pp. 166–167.
54. Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 59.
55. Sabri Jiryis, trans. Meric Dobson, *The Arabs in Israel: 1948–1966* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969), pp. 15–26 and Bugai, doc. 10, p. 231.
56. Alieva, vol. I, p. 313.
57. Michaela Pohl, p. 410.
58. Jiryis, pp. 92–111.
59. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, “Mustafa Jemiloglu, His Character and Convictions,” in Edward Allworth, ed. *Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 221–222 and S. Enders Wimbush and Ronald Wixman, “The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, vol. 17, nos. 2–3 (1975), pp. 335–336.

60. Mubeyyin Batu Altan, "Structures: The Importance of Family — A Personal Memory," in Allworth, pp. 99–100 and Arif Yunusov, *Meskhietian Turks: Twice Deported Peoples* (Baku: Institute of Peace and Democracy, 2000), p. 5.
61. *Tashkentskii protsess*, (Amsterdam: Herzen Fund, 1976), pp. 9–51 and *KTS* no. 19, pp. 167–168.
62. Pavel Polian, *Ne po svoei vole: Istoriia I geografiia prinuditel'nykh migratsii v SSSR* (Moscow, Memorial, 2001), p. 239.
63. J. Otto Pohl, *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), table I.1, p. 5.
64. Ibid.
65. See for example Bugai, *Ikh*, doc. 45, pp. 75–76 and doc. 46, p. 125.
66. Mark Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in their Repatriation* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 87–96.
67. Uri Davis, *Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within* (London: Zed, 2003), p. 31.
68. Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 175.
69. Palumbo, pp. 123–125.
70. Alieva, vol. II, pp. 175–179.
71. Jiryis, p. 91.
72. Nikolai Bugai, "40–50-e gody: Posledstviia, deportatsii narodov (svidetelstvuiut arkhivy NKVD-MVD SSSR)," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1, 1992, doc. 26, pp. 135–137.
73. Bugai, *Ikh*, doc. 48, pp. 264–265.
74. Rywkin, table 8, p. 67.
75. Sayigh, p. 4.
76. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights* (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), pp. 137–164.
77. *Tashkentskii protsess*, pp. 9–51.
78. *KTS*, no. 7, pp. 134–135.
79. Sayigh, pp. 59–65.
80. Lelia S. Kadi, *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement* (Beirtu: PLO Research Center, 1969), pp. 18–21.
81. Kadi, p. 18 and Sayigh, p. 196.
82. Kadi, p. 25.
83. Sayigh, pp. 202–210.
84. Sayigh, p. 213.
85. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "Krimskotatarskoe dvizhenie za vozvrashchenie v krym," *Krimski Studii*, September-November 2000 (5–6), p. 5.
86. *Tashkentskii protsess*, pp. 9–51.

References

- Alexeyeva, L. (1985). *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights*. Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Alexeyeva, L. (1998). "Mustafa Jemiloglu, His Character and Convictions," in Allworth, E. (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 206–225.
- Alexeyeva, L. (2000). "Krimskotatarskoe dvizhenie za vozvrashchenie v krym," *Krimski Studii*. September–November 2000 (5–6): 4–16.
- Aliev, I. (ed.) (1994). *Reabilitatsii narodov I grazhdan, 1954–1994, gody: Dokumenty*. Moscow: RAN.
- Alieva, S. (ed.) (1993). *Tak eto bylo: Natsional'nye repressii v SSSR, 1919–1952*. Moscow: Insan.
- Allworth, E. (1998). "Mass Exile, Ethnocide, Group Derogation: Anomaly or Norm in Soviet Nationality Policies?" in Allworth, E. (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 180–205.
- Altan, M. (1998). "Structures: The Importance of Family — A Personal Memoir," in Allworth, E. (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 99–109.

- Auman, V. and Chebatoreva V. (eds.) (1993). *Istoriia rossiiskikh nemtsev v dokumentakh, 1763–1992* gg. Moscow: MIGUP.
- Bell-Fialkoff, A. (1996). *Ethnic Cleansing*. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
- Bentsur, E. (ed.) (2000). *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941–1953*. London: Frank Cass.
- Brennan, D. (2004). "The Long Way Home," *Scotland on Sunday*. 29 February 2004 found at <<http://news.scotsman.com/archive.cfm?id+231942004>> downloaded 18 May 2004.
- Brod, P. (1979). "Soviet-Israeli Relations 1948–1956: from Courtship to Crisis," in Wistrich, R. (ed.) *The Left against Zion: Communism, Israel and the Middle East*. London: Valentine, Mitchell & Co., Ltd, pp. 50–70.
- Bugai, N. (ed.) (1992a). *Isosif Stalin – Lavrentiiu Berii: 'Ikh nado deportirvat': Dokumenty, fakty, kommentarii*. Moscow: Druzhba Narodov.
- Bugai, N. (ed.) (1992b). "40–50-e gody: Posledstviia, deportatsii narodov (svidetelstvuiut arkhivy NKVD-MVD SSSR)," *Istoriia SSSR*. 1992 (1): 122–143.
- Bugai, N. and Gonov, A. (1998). *Narody v eshelonakh (20–60-e gody)*. Moscow: Insan.
- Chodakiewicz, M. (2003). *After the Holocaust: Polish-Jewish Conflict in the Wake of World War II*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.
- Conquest, R. (1970). *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*. New York: Macmillan.
- Courtois, S. trans. Murphy, J. and Kramer, M. (1999). *The Black Book of Communism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Davis, U. (1987). *Israel: An Apartheid State*. London: Zed Books.
- Davis, U. (2003). *Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within*. London: Zed Books.
- Elliott, M. (1982). *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in their Repatriation*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Gilmour, D. (1982). *Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians*. London: Sphere Books.
- Govrin, Y. (1998). *Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953–1967: From Confrontation to Disruption*. London: Frank Cass.
- Guboglo, M. and Chervonnaia (eds.) (1992). *Krymsko-Tatarskoe national'noe dvizhenie, istoriia, problemy, perspektivy*. Moscow: RAN.
- Herman, E. and Chomsky, N. (1994). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. London: Vintage.
- Jirjis, S. trans. Meric Dobson (1969). *The Arabs in Israel: 1948–1966*. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Kadi, L. (1969). *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement*. Beirut: PLO Research Centre.
- Khronika Tekushchikh Sobyti (KTS)* (1979). Issues 1–27 (1968–1972). Amsterdam: Fond Gerstena.
- Khronika Tekushchikh Sobyti (KTS)* Issues 28–61 (1972–1981). New York: Khronika.
- Kramer, A. (1974). *The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1953*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Levin, N. (1990). *The Jews in the Soviet Union since 1917: Paradox of Survival*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Masalha, N. (1992). *Expulsion of the Palestinians*. Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Masalha, N. (1997). *A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer and the Palestinians 1949–1996*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Masalha, N. (2003). *The Politics of Denial: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem*. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.
- Mecklenburg, J. and Wipperman, W. (1998). "Roter Holocaust?" *Kritik des Schwarzbuchs des Kommunismus*. Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag.
- Naimark, N. (2001). *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pohl, J. (1999). *Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937–1949*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- Pohl, M. (2002). "'It Cannot Be That Our Graves Will Be Here': The Survival of Chechen and Ingush Deportees in Kazakhstan, 1944–1957," *Journal of Genocide Research*. (4) 3: 401–430.
- Polian, P. (2001). *Ne po svoei vole: Istoriia I geografiia prinuditel'nykh migratsii v SSSR*. Moscow: Memorial.
- Pumbo, M. (1987). *The Palestinian Catastrophe*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Sayigh, Y. (1997). *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Seytmuratova, A. (1998). "The Elders of the New National Movement: Recollections," in Allworth, E. (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 155–179.
- Shapira, A. (1992). *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Tashkentkii protsess* (1976). Amsterdam: Herzen Fund.
- Ther, P. (2001). *Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe: 1944–1948*. Lanaham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Weitz, E. (2003). *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wheatcroft, S. (1996). "The Scale and Nature of German and Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930–1945," *Europe-Asia Studies* 48 (8): 1319–1353.
- Wilson, A. (1998). "Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming," in Allworth, E. (ed.) *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 281–322.
- Wimbush, S. and Wixman, R. (1975). "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 17 (2–3): 320–339.
- Yunusov, A. (2000). *Meskhetian Turks: Twice Deported Peoples*. Baku: Institute of Peace and Democracy.

Copyright of Human Rights Review is the property of Transaction Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.